Wealth Inequality in the Netherlands, c. 1950-2015 : The paradox of a Northern European welfare state by Bavel, Bas, van & Frankema, Ewout
 • Introduction [Bolt & Ryckbosch]
• Wealth Inequality in the Netherlands since 1950 [Coenen]
• The Paradox of a Northern European Welfare State [Van Bavel & Frankema]
•  Wealth Inequality in Coastal Flanders in the 16th Century  
[Dombrecht & Ryckbosch]
• Data Stage: Life Expectancy at Birth (Zijdeman)
Special Issue: Inequality in the Low Countries
The Low Countries Journal 
of Social and Economic 
History
jaargang 14
2017
nummer 2

van bavel & frankema 29
Wealth Inequality in the Netherlands, c. 1950-2015
The Paradox of a Northern European Welfare State1
Bas van Bavel and Ewout Frankema
tseg 14 (2): 29-62
doi 10.5334/tseg2017.2.bave
Abstract
This paper reviews the available evidence on post-war trends in Dutch private 
wealth inequality using a range of scattered sources. Wealth tax records suggest 
a substantial decline in inequality to the 1970s and, more tentatively, a gradual  
rise thereafter. In the post-1990 years, Gini-coefficients of private wealth ine-
quality range from 0.8 to 0.9, which is at the high end of the international com-
parison. Such high levels of private wealth inequality contrast with relatively 
low levels of net income inequality; a paradox that the Netherlands share with 
other Northern European welfare states. We hypothesise that publicly funded 
life-time income security limits the wealth-formation by ordinary Dutch house-
holds, while the redistributive taxes required to finance this system are target-
ing income rather than wealth.  
1  Introduction
The past years have seen a revival of academic interest in the long-term evo-
lution of income and wealth inequality across the Western world, sparked 
in part by the publication of Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First 
Century in 2014.2 His key message is that capitalist systems of production 
are governed by a set of general economic laws that tend to drive up income 
and wealth inequalities within countries. This tendency is endogenous to 
 
1 We are grateful for the comments on previous drafts of this paper made by Arjan Lejour 
(Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, CPB), Wiemer Salverda (University of Am-
sterdam, UvA) and Nico Wilterdink (University of Amsterdam, UvA). We thank Annelies Tukker 
for excellent editorial assistance.
2 Thomas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century (Cambridge, MA 2014).
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capitalism and can only be reversed by state intervention, especially in the 
sphere of progressive taxation and redistribution, or temporarily pushed 
back by severe economic and political crises, such as the twentieth-centu-
ry world wars which involved a substantial destruction of physical capital 
and large-scale erosion of financial capital. 
Piketty’s thesis has been received with much acclaim as well as fierce 
criticism. The political left has hailed his work as new evidence in sup-
port of the view that the neoliberal turn of the late twentieth century has 
produced untenable levels of socio-economic inequality which are bound 
to undermine the values of democracy when left unchecked. Others have 
condemned Piketty’s thesis as neo-Marxist ideology or just as theoretical-
ly unsound. To many economists, for instance, it remains unclear why the 
long-term returns to capital should necessarily be higher than the long-
term returns to labour (the law of r>g), while in market economies the rela-
tive scarcity of production factors eventually sets the price.3 Other scholars 
again, inspired by the New Institutional Economics, have criticised Piketty 
for highlighting general economic laws and underplaying the role of eco-
nomic and political institutions, which in their view are primordial in sha-
ping economic inequality.4
Although the renewed interest in income and wealth inequality was 
already there before his book hit the headlines, Piketty’s thesis also stimu-
lated political engagement with the topic in the Netherlands.5 Most schol-
ars, statisticians and politicians agree that in terms of (net) income ine-
quality the Netherlands ranks among the world’s most egalitarian societies. 
In contrast to the notable increases in income inequality in Anglo-Saxon 
countries such as the US and UK, income inequality levels have remained 
rather stable in the Netherlands over the past decades. In fact, income in-
equality has been subject to close statistical surveillance during the entire 
post-war era. Whenever policy reforms threatened to hurt a specific group 
of income earners, these were quickly ‘repaired’ with reference to princi-
ples of ‘fairness’ and ‘solidarity’.
However, the more attention Dutch politicians have paid to the devel-
opment of income inequality, the less they have been concerned with the 
3 Branko Milanovic, ‘The return of “patrimonial capitalism”’, The Journal of Economic Litera-
ture 52 (2014) 519-534; P.H. Lindert, Making the most of capital in the 21st century. NBER Working 
Paper no. 20232 (2014). 
4 D. Acemoglu and J.A. Robinson, ‘The rise and decline of general laws of capitalism’, The Jour-
nal of Economic Perspectives 29 (2015) 3-28.
5 Bas van Bavel, ‘Vermogensongelijkheid terug op agenda’, 6 September 2011, www.socialevraag-
stukken.nl/vermogensongelijkheid-terug-op-agenda/ (27 May 2016).
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monitoring of developments in private wealth inequality. The lack of con-
sistent data on the incidence of private wealth inequality, and of insight 
into the distribution of collective arrangements for wealth entitlements 
(especially mandatory saving via pension funds), has pre-empted the pos-
sibility of political debates being carried by facts, instead of convictions.6 
Piketty’s Capital doesn’t offer much help here. As one of the leading coun-
tries in the onset of modern economic growth the Netherlands has been 
noticeably absent from his study. Apparently, Piketty found the data for the 
Netherlands too weak to yield reliable time-series, and if so, he would be 
right, particularly for the last half-century.
As Coenen points out in this special issue, and others have done before,7 
the wealth tax records of the Netherlands are notoriously incomplete and 
inconsistent, so that it seems impossible to construct a consistent time- 
series of Dutch wealth inequality for the long twentieth century. Since the 
introduction of the Dutch wealth tax in 1894, the definition of assets and 
taxable households has changed several times, and tax evasion by the rich 
has been pervasive. Even for recent years researchers have to make do with 
a combination of different sources to obtain some provisional conclusions 
on comparative levels and trends of Dutch wealth inequality. However, our 
attempt to put together the available evidence does suggest an unexpect-
ed and even paradoxical pattern: a combination of low income inequality 
and high wealth inequality.  
This paper aims to assemble and interpret the evidence we have for 
the post-war era, focussing on the question how comparatively large pri-
vate wealth inequality can be squared with the social and economic char-
acteristics of a typical Northern European welfare state. We hypothesise 
that publicly funded life-time income security limits the wealth-formation 
by ordinary Dutch households, while the redistributive taxes required to 
finance this system are targeting income rather than wealth. Elements of 
this have been identified or analysed before, including the lower propensi-
ty for lower income groups in countries with encompassing social security 
 
6 See Coenen, ‘Charting the development of wealth inequality in the Netherlands since 1950: 
an on-going quest’, this issue; B.J.P. van Bavel, ‘Vermogensongelijkheid in Nederland. De vergeten 
dimensie’, in: Monique Kremer and Mark Bovens ed., Hoe ongelijk is Nederland? Een verkenning 
van de ontwikkeling en gevolgen van economische ongelijkheid (WRR Verkenning/Amsterdam Uni-
versity Press 2014) 79-100. 
7 N. Wilterdink, Vermogensverhoudingen in Nederland. Ontwikkelingen sinds de negentiende 
eeuw (Amsterdam: Synopsis 1984); B. van Bavel and E. Frankema, Low income inequality, high 
wealth inequality. The puzzle of the Rhineland welfare states. CGEH Working paper no. 50 (2013). 
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 systems to save in order to counter the risk of income losses,8 but we feel 
this is the most explicit and comprehensive formulation of this hypothe-
sis in the literature as yet.
In this paper, we explore the net wealth in private hands by looking at 
savings, equities, shares in companies, private businesses, home ownership, 
and commercial movable and immovable property, minus mortgages and 
other debts. For some other wealth components that should ideally be in-
cluded – e.g. small loans and large shares of the wealth in private limited 
liability companies, trusts and offshore capital – we lack information. We 
also discuss the thorny issue of how to account for the vast rights to fu-
ture payments in Dutch collective pension schemes. Since Dutch citizens 
cannot access the pension funds to withdraw, secure, reallocate or transfer 
their capital, these ‘entitlements’ are fundamentally different from private 
wealth. However, as we will point out, pension rights do play a crucial role 
in understanding the causes and effects of private wealth inequality in the 
Netherlands, especially because they influence household decisions on sav-
ing, investment and consumption and may thus play a crucial role in the 
observed inequality paradox. 
2  Income and wealth inequality in the Netherlands:  
a welfare state paradox?
Together with the Scandinavian and Eastern European countries the Neth-
erlands has attained one of the most egalitarian net income distributions 
in the world during the second half of the twentieth century. According 
to the tax register data and the evidence from capital shares in historical 
national accounts, there was a sharp decline in income inequality levels 
during the interwar period (1914-1945), which continued at a more gradual 
pace up to the mid-1980s. Hartog and Veenbergen have shown that upper 
and lower deciles of the income distribution converged, resulting in declin-
ing Theil-coefficients. In addition, increasingly progressive income tax sys-
tems enlarged the gap between gross and net income inequality.9 In their 
 
8 For instance: N. Skopek, S. Buchholz and H.-P. Blossfeld, Wealth inequality in Europe and the 
delusive egalitarianism of Scandinavian countries. MPRA Paper no. 35307 (2011).
9 J. Hartog and J.G. Veenbergen, ‘Dutch treat. Long-run changes in personal income distribution’, 
De economist 126 (1978) 521-549; J.M.M. de Meere, Economische ontwikkeling en levensstandaard 
in Nederland gedurende de eerste helft van de negentiende eeuw. Aspecten en trends (The Hague 
1982). 
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survey of the evidence, Soltow and van Zanden even refer to the egalitari-
an revolution of the twentieth century.10
That said, from 1977 gross income inequality started to rise again, with 
middle incomes declining and higher incomes rising.11 As a result of grow-
ing redistribution this rise in gross income inequality hardly affected net 
income distribution. Where other OECD countries experienced a substan-
tial rise in income inequality in the last three to four decades, the Nether- 
lands has sustained low levels of net income inequality throughout: the 
slight rise of income inequality during the 1980s was from low initial lev-
els and Gini-coefficients stabilised in the course of the 1990s.12 The most 
recent estimates of Statistics Netherlands (Centraal Bureau voor de Statis-
tiek, CBS) indicate that the net disposable income inequality hovers at 
levels around 0.27-0.28 (figures for 2014, standardised household income), 
putting the Netherlands at the lower end of the middle group of OECD 
countries, where the modal Gini in 2012 was 0.30.13 
These figures demand two nuances, however. First, the CBS figures ex-
press a standardised household income. Prior to the standardisation exer-
cise, the Gini for net disposable household income in the Netherlands would 
 
10 L. Soltow and J.L. van Zanden, Income and wealth inequality in the Netherlands, 16th-20th cen-
tury (Amsterdam 1998) 175.
11 W. Salverda en A. B. Atkinson, ‘Top incomes in the Netherlands over the twentieth century’, 
in: A.B. Atkinson and T. Piketty ed., Top Incomes Over the Twentieth Century. A Contrast Between 
Continental European and English-Speaking Countries (Oxford 2007) 426-471; Wiemer Salverda, 
‘De tektoniek van de inkomensongelijkheid in Nederland’, in: Monique Kremer et al. ed., Hoe on-
gelijk is Nederland? Een verkenning van de ontwikkeling en gevolgen van economische ongelijkheid 
(Amsterdam University Press 2014) 39-58, 46-49.
12 See for studies reporting various aspects of this rise in income inequality: L.F. Katz and D.H. 
Autor, ‘Changes in the wage structure and earnings inequality’, in: O. Ashenfelter and D.E. Card 
ed., Handbook of Labor Economics, 3A (Amsterdam: Elsevier 1999) 1463-1555; Robert C. Feenstra 
and Gordon H. Hanson, ‘Global production sharing and rising inequality. A survey of trade and 
wages’, in: E. Kwan Choi and James Harrigan ed., Handbook of international trade (Malden, MA: 
Blackwell 2003) 146-185; Salverda and Atkinson, ‘Top incomes in the Netherlands over the twen-
tieth century’; OECD, Growing unequal? Income distribution and poverty in OECD countries (Par-
is: OECD 2008); Piketty, Capital. See for the Netherlands Koen Caminada and Kees Goudswaard, 
‘International trends in income inequality and social policy’, International Tax and Public Finance 
8 (2001) 395-415. Salverda and Atkinson offer further support showing that the top income shares 
in the Netherlands have remained remarkably constant since the late 1970s, Salverda and Atkin-
son, ‘Top Incomes’, 434-435. 
13 See CBS Statline, ‘Inkomensongelijkheid. Particuliere huishoudens naar diverse kenmerken’ 
(2015) http://statline.cbs.nl/Statweb/publication/?DM=SLNL&PA=71511NED&D1=0,5&D2=a&D
3=0&D4=a&VW=T (22 March 2016); OECD, ‘Income inequality (indicator)’ (2016) https://data.
oecd.org/inequality/income-inequality.htm (22 March 2016). 
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be around 0.34.14 Second, the CBS figures on net income distribution do 
not take full account of household income derived from wealth and wealth 
gains. Moreover, incidental revenues from wealth are entirely missing. These 
gaps are inherent to the specific organisation of the Dutch fiscal system, 
from which the CBS derives its information.15 Taking income from wealth 
into account would drive up figures on income inequality in the Nether-
lands substantially. Even then, levels of net income inequality would still be 
much lower than they had been in the first half of the twentieth century.
Up to a point, a similar decline can be observed with regard to wealth 
inequality during the twentieth century. This decline is charted by Wilter-
dink, who used wealth tax and inheritance or succession tax records to es-
timate the development of top wealth shares. His work suggests that there 
has been a parallel movement of declining income inequality and wealth 
inequality in the Netherlands from the late nineteenth century until the 
mid-1970s. Table 1 shows that the percentage shares of total wealth owned 
by the top 0.1, 1 and 5 percent of wealth owning households decreased from 
the pre-war period 1895-1914 onwards with respectively 12, 26 and 27 per-
centage points. The share of the top 5 percent declined from almost four 
fifths (79 percent) to just over one half (52 percent). As Coenen argues in 
this issue, while the reported levels are prone to both serious underestima-
tion (are all wealth owners included? what is the degree of tax evasion?) 
and overestimation (the estimates of total wealth that constitute the de-
nominator are probably far too low), the decline up to the mid-1970s itself 
is very probable.16
14 For criticism on the use of standardised household income and the resulting underestima-
tion of income inequality: Salverda, ‘De tektoniek van de inkomensongelijkheid in Nederland’, 
esp. 45-49.
15 Bas van Bavel and Wiemer Salverda, ‘Vermogensongelijkheid in Nederland’, Economisch Sta-
tistische Berichten 99 (2014) 392-395, 395.
16 Total private household wealth has not been estimated independently from the size of wealth 
reported in the tax registers, but by assuming a log-normal wealth distribution pattern extrapo-
lated from the tax-paying cohorts towards the lower tail of the distribution. The problem is that 
shifts in the distribution of tax-payers’ wealth are directly translated into shifts in the distribution 
of total wealth. Yet, the wealth tax paying households only made up between three to ten per-
cent of total Dutch households in the entire period. If wealth taxation suffers from underreport-
ing (which it always does but to varying degrees) this causes an underestimation of total wealth. 
Wilterdink acknowledges that the margins of error of his total wealth estimates are higher for the 
postwar decades than for the earlier period (Wilterdink, Vermogensverhoudingen in Nederland. 
Ontwikkelingen sinds de negentiende eeuw, 110 and 403-406) as the problem of wealth tax evasion 
grew due to increasing asset mobility, growing tax evasion knowledge, a changing tax morale and 
weaker monitoring by tax authorities.
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Table 1. The share of estimated total wealth in the Netherlands owned by the top 0.1, 1 and 
5 percent of wealth owners, 1894-1974 
  top 0.1% top 1% top 5%
1894 0,23 0,54 0,79
1905 0,24 0,55 0,79
1914 0,25 0,57 0,80
1919 0,22 0,50 0,76
1925 0,21 0,48 0,73
1930 0,21 0,48 0,74
1935 0,17 0,42 0,68
1939 0,19 0,45 0,71
1951 0,13 0,34 0,60
1955 0,14 0,35 0,62
1960 0,15 0,38 0,64
1965 – 0,33 0,59
1970 0,12 0,31 0,56
1974 0,11 0,28 0,52
Source: N. Wilterdink, Vermogensongelijkheid in Nederland, 101.
The contraction of the top wealth shares occurred mainly during periods 
of economic and political crisis: the First World War and the Russian revo-
lution, the Great Depression in the 1930s and the Second World War and 
its aftermath. Shortly after the Second World War the Netherlands lost its 
main colony Indonesia. The lion’s share of Dutch owned assets there were 
nationalised in 1956-1960, which must have further contributed to a decli-
ne of wealth inequality.17 Studies on wealth distribution in other European 
countries corroborate this: wars and crises destroyed large amounts of ca-
pital and wealth, hitting the rich relatively hard.18 
Alongside the impact of crises, the ‘egalitarian revolution’ of the twen-
tieth century has played a large role, including the associated government 
17 J.T. Lindblad, Historical foundations of a national economy in Indonesia, 1890s-1990s (Amster-
dam: Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen 1996).
18 T. Piketty and E. Saez, ‘Income inequality in the United States, 1913-1998’, The Quarterly Jour-
nal of Economics 118 (2003) 1-39; T. Piketty and E. Saez, The evolution of top incomes. A historical 
and international perspective. NBER working paper no. 11955 (2006); Anthony Barnes Atkinson 
and Thomas Piketty, Top Incomes Over the Twentieth Century. A Contrast Between Continental Euro- 
pean and English-Speaking Countries (2007); Piketty, Capital.
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policies.19 These included the build-up of collective wealth, subsidies for 
small savings, the introduction or increase of wealth taxes and the reduc-
tion of income inequalities via progressive income tax schemes. A small 
segment of these policies explicitly aimed at the reduction of wealth ine-
qualities, as most clearly with the succession or inheritance tax. This tax 
was made progressive in 1911 and was gradually raised in the course of 
the twentieth century, although it remained always contested, tax rates re-
mained modest (from 1945: 3 to 17 percent), and it was often evaded, for 
instance by gifts inter vivos.20 Much more important were the many other 
policies that only implicitly or indirectly tackled wealth inequality, but still 
had a real reducing effect.
The potential margin of error in Wilterdink’s time series becomes clear 
when one compares his estimates of total private household wealth with 
more recent series of net private wealth constructed by the Dutch Bureau 
of Central Planning (Centraal Plan Bureau, CPB). The CPB estimates total 
wealth at 248.1 billion guilders in 1970, which is 187 percent of Wilterdink’s 
estimate of 132.5 billion guilders. Another indication that Wilterdink’s es-
timates of total wealth are far too low is that in 1974 they only constitute 
84 percent of Dutch GDP.21 In other industrialised countries the net pri-
vate wealth held by households tends to exceed annual income levels by a 
factor of four to six.22 The CPB estimates of the Dutch wealth to GDP ratio 
for the period 1970-2008 give 1.6 to 2.3, which still puts the Netherlands on 
the lower side of the international comparison.23
Because wealth tax records usually lack information about total wealth 
independent from changes in wealth held by the upper strata, top wealth 
share estimates retain an uncertain margin of error.24 Mierheim and Wicke 
 
19 Soltow and Van Zanden, Income and wealth inequality, 175-191; N. Wilterdink, Vermogens- 
ongelijkheid in Nederland. Ontwikkelingen sinds 1850 (Amsterdam 2015) 299-319.
20 Wilterdink, Vermogensongelijkheid in Nederland, 178-179, 214-215 and 297. For recent develop-
ments: J.J. Gilst, H. Nijboer and J.C.L. Caminada, ‘De successiebelasting vanuit economisch per-
spectief’, Weekblad voor fiscaal recht 137 (2008) 1423-1430.
21 Wilterdink, Vermogensongelijkheid in Nederland, p. 100: 171.5 billion guilders in 1974, compared 
to a GDP of 205.6 billion guilders.
22 See the data for Finland, Sweden, Germany, Italy, UK and US offered by the Luxemburg 
Wealth Study (LWS) in E. Sierminska, A. Brandolini and T.M. Smeeding, Comparing wealth dis-
tribution across rich countries. First results from the Luxembourg wealth study. Paper prepared for 
the 29th general conference of The International Association for Research in Income and Wealth 
(Joensuu, Finland 2006) 33; see also Coenen Figure 2, this issue.
23 CPB, Macro Economische Verkenning 2008 (2007).
24 Anthony Atkinson, ‘Concentration among the rich’, in: James Davies ed., Personal wealth from 
a global perspective (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press 2008) 65.
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illustrate this point in a painstaking and never repeated exercise, by ad-
justing the wealth inequality estimates for West Germany in 1973 for the 
missing wealth of the richest households using a source which, exception-
ally for Germany, also included the value of equity in private businesses 
(which is concentrated in the wealthiest group). They obtained a Gini of 
0.75, which is considerably higher than the Ginis calculated without these 
corrections for 1969 and 1983 (0.68-0.70).25
For the fifteen years between 1975 and 1990 we know next to nothing 
about the development of wealth inequality in the Netherlands, because 
several consecutive tax reforms further reduced the value of tax records for 
analytical purposes.26 In order to stimulate the depressed Dutch economy 
entrepreneurs were granted a tax exemption threshold up to more than 
200 percent of the exemption threshold for private households. In addi-
tion, increasing rates of inflation resulted in various rapid adjustments of 
the wealth threshold level. Resulting inconsistencies were the main argu-
ment for Wilterdink, writing in 1984, to stop his analysis in 1974, although 
he posited that private wealth inequality had probably started to rise again 
from the start of the 1980s, at least temporarily.27 
Returning to the issue in 2015, Wilterdink argues that his guess about the 
rise of wealth inequality from the early-1980s had been correct, but that he 
did not foresee that it was the start of a more continuous and structured 
upward movement.28 Indications for this, however, are still as scarce as they 
had been before. One of these indications is that the number of million-
aires according to the wealth statistics more than doubled in the period 
1980-1990, while average disposable household income only increased by 30 
percent. Also, the wealth of the top one percent had reached its lowest ever 
relative share in 1980 but started to rise thereafter. As Wilterdink himself 
notes, these scarce indications are based on the same incomplete sources 
that had forced him to end his seminal book with 1974 data.
25 H. Mierheim and L. Wicke, Die personelle Vermögungsverteilung in der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland (Tübingen 1978); Holger Stein and Richard Hauser, Inequality of the distribution of 
personal wealth in Germany 1973-1998. Levy Economics Institute working paper no. 398 (2004).
26 See also Coenen, this issue.
27 Wilterdink, Vermogensverhoudingen in Nederland. Ontwikkelingen sinds de negentiende eeuw, 
385. His working paper from 1991 on developments in the 1980s suffered from the same source 
problems and should also be seen as an educated guess about trends. Wilterdink, Vermogensver-
houdingen in Nederland. Recente ontwikkelingen.
28 Wilterdink, Vermogensongelijkheid in Nederland, 335, 342-343.
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3  Recent trends of wealth inequality, 1991-2015
Much firmer ground is only reached in 1991, as from this year onwards, 
new surveys of private wealth distribution became available. In this section 
we will evaluate four sources that can be used to measure private wealth 
inequality. Although the available sources for the post-1990 era provide a 
better insight into comparative levels and trends than the dearth of data 
for the late 1970s and 1980s, it should be noted upfront that none of these 
sources offers a complete picture, nor do they provide us with consistent 
time-series. 
The CBS wealth statistics 
Statistics Netherlands (CBS) has published statistics on the decile distribu-
tion of Dutch private household wealth for irregular years since 1991 and 
annual estimates since 2006. The CBS derives its data from a variety of 
sources, the most important of which are samples taken from the income 
and tax registers, complemented by data from the income panel survey (con-
taining some 250,000 persons, conducted by CBS) and the social economic 
panel survey (containing some 13,000 persons, conducted by CBS). Since 
2011 the CBS has adopted an integral approach to income and tax regis-
ters, using all data available at the Dutch tax authorities (Belastingdienst) 
to compute total private household wealth and divide this into percentiles 
of private wealth ownership. 
The CBS wealth statistics have several limitations. A minor limitation is 
that the wealth saved by way of savings-based and endowment mortgages is 
not included in the figures. In 2012, this was 38.4 billion Euro, which would 
amount to more than 3 percent of total private wealth. Since this wealth is 
often found with households with high mortgages, who are now often rep-
resented in the statistics with high negative wealth, including this wealth 
component would have a dampening effect on wealth inequality figures. 
More specifically, for the year 2012 it would reduce the Gini of wealth ine-
quality by a little over one percentage point.29
More importantly, there are two major limitations of the CBS wealth 
statistics. Firstly, collective pension savings are not taken into account, and 
given the latest estimates of the total value of Dutch pension funds, (1,257 
billion Euro in 2012 according to the CPB)30 the wealth stored in pension 
29 A. Kooiman and A. Lejour, Vermogensongelijkheid in Nederland, CPB Achtergronddocument 
(2016).
30 Frank van Es and Henk Kranendonk, ‘Vermogensschokken en consumptie in Nederland’, CPB 
Achtergronddocument (2014) 23.
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funds accounts for about 40 to 50 percent of total private wealth. It may be 
argued that the exclusion of these pension savings is justified, since seen 
from the perspective of the household these are not a form of wealth but 
rights to future income streams, that cannot be used, transferred or inher-
ited like other forms of wealth. Still, the presence of these pension rights 
needs to be taken into account when analysing and explaining wealth dis-
tribution, so we will return to pensions below (see section ‘The distribu-
tional implications of Dutch pension coffers’). 
Secondly, it is unlikely that the wealthiest Dutch households, i.e. the super- 
rich, are fully represented in the wealth statistics. The value of private lim-
ited liability companies, where large segments of their wealth are stored, 
is often deliberately pushed down for fiscal reasons. Moreover, any wealth 
component that cannot be attributed to an individual or household, or can-
not be observed because it is placed in a private limited liability company 
or another corporation, remains excluded.31 This probably also applies to 
the substantial amounts in approximately 150,000 pension-BVs (limited lia- 
bility companies) of directors and major shareholders, even though they 
often can be inherited or transferred and therefore fall under the definition 
of private wealth. As we will demonstrate below, a comparison of Quote 
500 estimates of total wealth of the 500 richest households with the CBS 
top 0.1 percent share of wealthiest households (about 4,600 households) 
indicates that there is a huge gap, which may point to an overestimation by 
Quote magazine, but almost certainly also reveals major underestimation 
of the wealth held by the super-rich in the tax-records used by the CBS. 
We will come back to this issue further below.
Figure 1 presents the CBS estimates of the top and bottom decile of 
the private wealth distribution and the Gini-coefficients for the years after 
1991 that the CBS has published in its wealth statistics. Table 2 presents 
the shares of wealth held by the bottom and top ten percent of the private 
household wealth distribution for the same years. The switch from a sample- 
based approach to an integral approach to wealth distribution does not 
make much of a difference for the inequality estimates, as a comparison 
of the two figures for 2011 in Table 2 demonstrates.
Figure 1 shows that the year 2009, with the onset of the financial crisis, 
marks the start of an impressive rise in wealth inequality with Ginis up to 
0.89. Table 2 also shows that among the bottom ten percent of the distri-
bution the levels of net debts were rising since the early 1990s, while the 
top ten percent share in total wealth declined until 2009, if we disregard 
31 For this source problem see Coenen, this issue.
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the outliers (1993 and 2000) reported by van Eijck. The share of the bot-
tom ten percent moved from -1.5 percent in 1991 to -3.9 percent in 2006. 
After 2009 the rapid rise of the Gini-coefficient was driven by a divergence 
between the top and the bottom deciles: The bottom ten percent share in 
total wealth further decreased to -5.2 percent in 2014 and the share of the 
top ten percent rose to 67 percent. 
According to calculations made by CPB analysists Kooiman and Lejour, 
most of the post-2009 rise in wealth inequality can be explained by the eco-
nomic crisis, and especially the declining value of real estate (i.e. private 
house ownership).32 The bursting of the real estate bubble hit the wealth
32 Kooiman and Lejour, Vermogensongelijkheid in Nederland, 9-11.
Figure 1. Gini Coefficients of Private Household Wealth Inequality, CBS estimates, 
1991-2014
Sources: For the years 1991, 1996 and 1997: CBS, Inkomen en vermogen 1992-1994; CBS, Sociaal-Econo-
mische Maandstatistiek, July 1996, Jaarboek Welvaartsverdeling 1998 en 2000; For the years 2006-2014: 
CBS, Statline vermogensstatistieken. The CNBS retrieved its original data mainly from income and wealth 
tax records, the CBS, Inkomenspanelonderzoek (IPO) and the CBS, Sociaal-Economisch Panelonderzoek 
(SEP). For the years 1991-1997 we computed the Gini-coefficients ourselves. For the years 2006-2014 they 
are provided by CBS, Statline.*
* Letter of the Dutch state secretary of finance, S.R.A. van Eijck to the chair of the Dutch parliament, re-
sponding to the motie Vendrik, 14 October 2002, mentions much lower Gini coefficients for the years 1993 
and 2000, at around 0.72 S.R.A. van Eijck, Brief van de Staatssecretaris van Financiën aan de Voorzitter van 
de Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal (letter no. 130, notitie over vermogensverhoudingen in Nederland). 
14 October 2002, https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-26727-130.html (6 July 2106). It is unclear 
to us why van Eijck has reported these data, and disregarded the more reliable estimates that were avail-
able at the time of writing.
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Table 2. The shares of wealth held by the bottom and top ten percent of the private house-
hold wealth distribution, CBS estimates 1991-2014
 
 
Bottom 10%
sample
Bottom 10%
integral
Top 10%
sample
Top 10%
integral
1991 -0,015 0,64
1993 -0,02 0,61
1996 -0,029 0,61
1997 -0,03 0,61
2000 -0,027 0,58
2006 -0,039 0,602
2007 -0,026 0,595
2008 -0,028 0,591
2009 -0,022 0,584
2010 -0,032 0,62
2011 -0,035 -0,034 0,626 0,631
2012 -0,037 0,64
2013 -0,055 0,692
2014  -0,052  0,698
Sources: see figure 1. 
position of the middle groups particularly hard and pushed a considerable 
number of Dutch households into a net debt position. Households that held 
mortgages up to or even over 100 percent of the purchase price, ended up 
with mortgage loans that substantially exceeded the present value of their 
real estate. Only in some cases was this counterbalanced by the wealth sa-
ved by way of savings-based and endowment mortgages. The high levels 
of mortgage debt among Dutch households have been fiscally stimulated, 
because interest payments could be deducted from income tax liabilities – 
and still can, albeit under tightened conditions. Since the share of real 
estate is much lower in the portfolio of the top wealth groups, who tend to 
hold a much larger share of their portfolio in other (financial) assets, the 
crisis did not hit their wealth position to a similar extent. Stock markets 
and other equity funds were certainly affected, but have recovered much 
more quickly since 2009. In the bottom tails of the wealth distribution 
households without any form of real estate ownership are overrepresented. 
The interesting question is whether the rather dramatic rise in private 
wealth inequality to a Gini of almost 0.90 should be regarded as an inci-
dental break away from a long-term equilibrium of a Gini around 0.77-0.80. 
Or, alternatively, whether the economic crisis has brought overheated real 
estate prices back to a more stable long-term equilibrium, and that the 
housing bubble shielded a rising trend in the wealth distribution during 
42 vol. 14, no. 2, 2017
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the two decades between 1990 and 2010. Kooiman and Lejour only survey 
the period 2006-2013, in which the inflated real estate prices are taken as 
a given. Yet, an analysis over a longer period of time may offer a different 
picture. While it is too early to answer this question, it seems clear that the 
rising net debt positions of Dutch households have indeed been a trend 
that started long before the crisis of 2008. The fiscal stimuli (in particular 
the favourable fiscal treatment of mortgage payments) have been reduced 
somewhat in recent years via several fiscal policy reforms, but as these re-
forms slowly take effect, they may also put a new ceiling on the recovery 
of real estate prices, thus leaving part of the increase in wealth inequality 
intact.      
The DNB Household Surveys
In comparison to the CBS statistics of private household wealth, the annu-
ally conducted household surveys of the Dutch Central Bank (DNB) have 
one major advantage: the surveys include questions on all the major com-
ponents of household wealth and debt, varying from stocks, real estate 
and luxury goods such as cars, caravans and boats to the level of mortga-
ge debt, delayed payments of rent or utilities bills and different types of 
consumer credit.33 In particular such smaller assets and debts are not in-
cluded in the CBS wealth statistics. The DNB also took several measures to 
set up a random sample, without truncation for very wealthy households, 
as is the case in the Social-Economic Panel Surveys, conducted by Statis-
tics Netherlands (CBS). 
The main disadvantage of the household surveys is that the number of 
households that has fully completed the survey is relatively low, varying 
from 1,500 to 2,500 households.34 Moreover, since the surveys were not trun-
cated for the super-rich, the chances that they would voluntarily cooperate 
were low. Although tax records used by the CBS are bound to miss the pro-
portion of wealth tax evasion, which may even be higher than many would 
have considered before the release of the ‘Panama Papers’ in 2016, it seems 
unlikely that participants in the DNB household surveys would report part 
of the wealth they hold outside the surveillance of the Dutch tax authori-
ties. The problem of exclusion of the super-rich in the household surveys 
will be demonstrated in Table 3 below, where we compare the top 1 percent 
wealth shares from the household surveys with the estimates derived from 
33 Only jewellery and art objects are excluded.
34 Defined here as: the head of the household, his/her partner, resident children and – but ex-
ceptionally – other residents such as grandparents.
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the CBS wealth statistics and the Quote 500 index. Since the top one and 
ten percent of the recorded household wealth distribution is considerably 
lower than those provided by the CBS, let alone the Quote 500, Gini-indi-
ces based on the DNB surveys are also out of the range. For the 2000s our 
estimates are in the order of 0.63 to 0.71, which is certainly too low.       
The Quote 500
The list of wealth owned by the 500 richest Dutch households published 
by Quote Magazine has never been systematically used for academic pur-
poses. The list has been published annually since 1996. The top 500 repre-
sents the top 0.007 percent of Dutch households. The Quote 500 is based 
on a combination of official publications and informal sources, including 
annual business reports, real estate sales prices, registers of the Chambers 
of Commerce, stock prices and questionnaires. Gathering and analysing 
these data is a painstaking job, which according to the editors of the mag-
azine involves a team of four people and requires c. 1.5 fulltime staff years 
of research per publication.35 Some of the recorded wealth owners par-
ticipate voluntarily by providing their own estimates of their wealth posi-
tion. These people may have reasons to either overstate or understate their 
wealth, but they also run the risk that this will come to light when the in-
formation provided is checked with official documentation. Other candi-
dates object to the publication of the Quote 500 and refuse to cooperate.36 
Figure 2 presents the percentage share of total wealth owned by the 
500 ‘super-rich’ according to Quote magazine. The total private household 
wealth estimates are taken from the Centraal Plan Bureau (CPB), which in 
turn has based part of its series on the CBS wealth statistics. The increase 
in the share of the top 500, from approximately seven percent in 1997 to 
over 12 percent in 2012 is large and probably a little overstated, but if we 
consider the first year of publication as an outlier due to a lack of meth-
odological experience, the time trend seems to be consistent with the fluc-
tuations in the global stock and local real estate markets. 
There is definitely a positive relationship between stock price develop-
ments and the share of wealth owned by the super-rich, because the lat-
ter tend to hold a disproportionally large share of their wealth in company 
35 Based on personal correspondence with the two editors of the magazine (Jordy Hubers and 
Tom Wouda) in November 2014.
36 The use of such lists as provided by Forbes magazine or Fortune (US), the Sunday Times (UK) 
or the Business Review Weekly (Australia) in the wealth distribution literature seems to be gener-
ally accepted by now, despite their possible shortcomings (Atkinson, ‘Concentration among the 
rich’, 69-70).  
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shares. In 2011, the top one percent of wealth owners in the Netherlands 
owned seven percent of net housing wealth and no less than 37 percent of 
financial wealth. In the latter category, the top one percent even owned 83 
percent of substantial shares (over five percent) in companies, while the 
top 0.1 percent owned 49 percent.37 The impressive jump of the top 500 
from a wealth share of ten percent in 2010 to 12.5 percent in 2012 under-
lines the uneven impact of the economic crisis on the wealth positions of 
the super-rich and the median wealth owner. But also in the years of the 
dot.com hype (1997-2000) the wealth share of the top 500 rose quickly, a 
trend that was stabilised during the subsequent collapse of international 
stock markets (2001-02). During the recent global depression and the col-
lapse of stock markets in 2008-2009 the share of the top 500 fell substan-
tially, although the rise in 2008 (and hence part of the fall in 2009) may 
be partly explained by differences in timing: the Quote wealth estimates 
37 Van Bavel and Salverda, ‘Vermogensongelijkheid in Nederland’, 394. See for Finland: M. Jäntti, 
‘Trends in the distribution of income and wealth. Finland, 1987-98’, in: E.N. Wolff ed., International 
perspectives on household wealth (Cheltenham: Elgar 2006) 295-326. 
Figure 2. The percentage share of total wealth owned by the Quote top 500 index, 
1997-2012
Sources: Quote Magazine, various issues 1996-2012. Number of households are taken from CBS Statline 
and estimates of total private household wealth for 2006-2014 are taken from CBS vermogensstatistiek 
and extrapolated backwards to 1997 with data from the CPB Macro-Economische Verkenningen (the data 
series were kindly provided by Dr. Martin Mellens (CPB)). The years 2012-2015 are not included because of 
a major break in the unit of calculation (from families to individuals).
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are based on 1 August and the CPB wealth estimates on 31 December. The 
Quote figures therefore missed the collapse of stock prices in the autumn of 
2008, whereas these were incorporated in the total wealth data of the CPB. 
If we give some credibility to the Quote-500 figures, these force us to 
interpret the top wealth shares from the household surveys as minimum 
estimates: if the top 500 of wealth owners (about 0.007 percent) already 
possess some ten percent of total wealth, it is impossible that the top 1 
percent, including over 70,000 households, owns a similar or even slight-
ly lower percentage of total wealth, as is borne out in table 3. Indeed, the 
share of very wealthy households in the DNB household surveys seems 
to be seriously underestimated. There is one spot of evidence that proves 
this point, because we retrieved one ‘super-rich’ household in the house- 
hold survey of 1995. The usual amount of wealth owned by the richest 
household in the household survey is about one to two million euros in the 
1990s. In the 1995 survey, however, the richest household possessed almost 
50 million euros. We excluded this outlier from our calculations in table 3 
because the sample size was too low to contain one ‘super-rich’. We would
Illustration 1: The number of millionaires in the Netherlands rapidly increased over 
the past decades, more than doubling in the period 1980-1990 for instance, and the 
pace of this increase was much faster than that of average disposable household 
income. The first ‘miljonair fair’ in the Netherlands was organized in 2001. Photo: 
Anko Stoffels.
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Table 3. Top wealth shares, 2006-2012 
 
 
Quote
Top 0,007%
500 households
CBS Wealth stats
Top 1%
c. 71-75.000 households
DNB Household Surveys
Top 1%
c. 71-75.000 households
2006 10,7 11,6 9,3
2007 10,9 12,3 10,8
2008 10,9 11,6 9,7
2009 10 14,7 10,6
2010 11 14,5 9,2
2011 12 11,9 8,5
2012 12,5 13 10,8
Source: CBS Statline, Vermogensstatistiek; Quote Magazine 2006-2012; DNB Household Surveys 2006-2009.
 
need a sample size of some 13,000 households to include one super-rich 
household from the top 500. When we artificially inflate our sample size 
from 1995 five times (which gives 12,080), normalise the distribution and 
then add this super-rich household, we would see an increase of the top 
1 percent share from 8.5 to 16.9 percent. A comparable conclusion was 
reached by Philip Vermeulen, who attempted to correct the calculations 
of top wealth shares by way of the European household surveys for non- 
response and underreporting.38  
A similar story holds for the underestimation of the super-rich in tax 
record data used by the CBS. For the period 2006-2014 the CBS has split its 
sample into a percentile distribution. This makes it possible to tabulate the 
top 1 percent wealth shares and compare these to the estimates of the Quote 
500, showing that these shares are almost similar. Since we can be sure that 
not all wealth owned by the super-rich is captured by the tax records due 
to both illegal tax evasion and legal tax avoidance instruments, to which 
the middle or bottom wealth owning groups have no access, and since the 
wealth in private limited liability companies is often only partially captured 
by the tax records and therefore not fully included in the CBS figures, the 
estimated top 1 percent of the CBS must be an underestimate. The same 
conclusion can be reached on the basis of the more detailed information 
provided by the CBS for the year 2012. The top 0.025 percent, comprising 
1,900 households, in that year owned 3.9 percent of total wealth according 
38 Philip Vermeulen, Estimating the top tail of the wealth distribution. European Central Bank 
working paper series no. 1907 (2016).
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to the CBS figures, compared to 12.5 percent of total wealth owned by the 
500 wealthiest families according to Quote (see Table 3).
 
SHARE data
The last source to be discussed is the data provided by the Survey of Health, 
Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE). This is a longitudinal dataset 
from a representative sample of people aged 50 years and older and con-
tains ample information about wealth. The respondents are asked about 
ownership of their main residence, other real estate, bank accounts, bonds, 
stocks, individual retirement accounts, contractual savings for housing, 
whole life insurance, own business and vehicles, and they are asked about 
any mortgage on the main residence and any debts other than the mort-
gage. Although the dataset pertains to a specific subset of the population 
(therefore, figures cannot be compared directly) it is relevant because mul-
tiple imputation methods are used in order to correct for the missing ob-
servations and the high and low ends of the distribution,39 thus offering a 
fairly reliable impression of the distribution of net wealth.
Data on wealth are analysed for the second wave of SHARE (2006/2007). 
In the Netherlands, the top-five percent of people over 50 years owned 42 
percent of total wealth in this age group, the top-ten percent owned 54 
percent and the bottom-50 percent owned 8 percent, while the Gini-coef-
ficient is at 0.69.40 As said, this cannot be compared to the other figures 
relating to all households, but they can be compared to the figures for the 
other twelve European countries included in the dataset. These show that 
the Netherlands is at the top of wealth inequality, together with the Czech 
Republic and only surpassed by Poland.
4  The distributional implications of Dutch pension coffers
We have already touched upon the question whether pension savings should 
be included in accounts of private wealth distribution. In a strict sense, and 
seen from the perspective of the households, they should not, since they 
contain rights to future income streams that cannot be used, transferred or 
inherited like other forms of wealth. Pension savings cannot be stacked and 
39 Dimitrios Christelis, Tullio Jappelli and Mario Padula, Wealth and portfolio composition in 
SHARE – The Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe. Centre for Studies in Economics 
and Finance working paper 132 (2006). See also: Skopek, Buchholz and Blossfeld, Wealth inequal-
ity in Europe and the delusive egalitarianism of Scandinavian countries, 8-9.
40 Ibidem, 13-14.
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cannot be accumulated over generations, as wealth is, and they do not offer 
the economic power and social leverage that wealth does. However, when 
looking at the wealth distribution from an angle of postponed consump-
tion opportunities, as economists adopting life-cycle perspectives often do, 
it does make sense to include pension rights in private wealth. 
Regardless of this conceptual discussion, any explanation of private 
wealth inequality in the Netherlands should take into account these pen-
sion rights, since private wealth and (voluntary or obligatory) pension sav-
ings operate, at least partly, as substitutes. The substitution effect may be 
especially relevant for the Dutch case, since the wealth accumulated in 
Dutch pension funds is huge by any international standard. With an esti-
mated total of €1,257 billion in 2012,41 the amount was more or less equal 
to the total sum of private wealth. Especially in the period c. 1980-2010 the 
wealth held by Dutch pension funds has greatly increased, by more than 
a factor of twelve, while national income in the same period had grown 
only by a factor of 3.5.42 It is often intuitively argued that taking claims to 
these funds into account would have a large equalizing effect on the wealth 
distribution, since much of it is found with the middle classes, and more 
specifically with the public servants. But what do we actually know about 
the distribution of pension rights?
In a recent study by Knoef et al. pension rights for the year 2008 are op-
erationalised as an income stream from annuities.43 This study shows that 
pension rights are highly concentrated among the highest income deciles. 
This is also indicated by the remittances by employers for the pensions of 
their employees. Some 45 percent of the total remittances is destined for 
the top ten percent of household incomes.44 The effect of the distribution of 
pension rights on the wealth distribution has also been investigated recent-
ly. The tentative results by Caminada, Goudswaard and Knoef show that 
pension rights are distributed more equally across Dutch households than 
private wealth.45 The authors claim that imputing these pension claims to 
wealth of households (using the CBS data for 2010) would reduce the share 
of the top ten percent from 61 to 47 percent, and that of the top one per-
41 Es and Kranendonk, ‘Vermogensschokken en consumptie in Nederland’, 23.
42 Wilterdink, Vermogensongelijkheid in Nederland, 356-357.
43 M. Knoef et al., Measuring retirement savings adequacy. A first multi-pillar approach in the 
Netherlands (Tilburg: Netspar 2013) 18-19.
44 Salverda, ‘De tektoniek van de inkomensongelijkheid in Nederland’.
45 Koen Caminada, Kees Goudswaard and Marike Knoef, ‘Vermogen in Nederland gelijker 
verdeeld sinds eind negentiende eeuw’ (2014) www.mejudice.nl/artikelen/detail/vermogen-in- 
nederland-gelijker-verdeeld-sinds-eind-negentiende-eeuw (1 July 2016).
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cent from 25 to 17 per cent. Since academic published work on this exer-
cise is lacking as yet, it remains unclear how this result has been reached.46 
It should be noted, however, that pension rights are calculated as gross 
amounts, whereas a third or more will be taxed before it is available for 
household consumption or saving. The effect of adding pension rights to 
private wealth will, therefore, be much smaller than these figures suggest, 
even if we assume that some wealth components are gross amounts and 
should also be corrected for future taxation. The same caveat, or criticism, 
also holds for the recent work done by the CPB. Here, it is stated that in-
cluding pension rights in wealth calculations would reduce the Gini coef-
ficient for wealth inequality by 14 percentage points in 2006 and by almost 
17 percentage points in 2013.47 However, this calculation also includes the 
gross value of pension rights. Further, comparisons of absolute levels are 
difficult to make, because the authors use a panel of households that is not 
representative of the total population. Still, despite these caveats, and ack-
nowledging the difficulties involved in any exercise aimed at getting more 
reliable or precise figures, it is clear that the presence of pension rights has 
great effects on the nature of private wealth inequality in the Netherlands. 
5  Dutch wealth inequality in an international perspective
In this section we assess current levels of Dutch private wealth inequality in 
an international comparative perspective, starting from the work by James 
Davies and collaborators.48 In their attempt to estimate a global distribu-
tion of household wealth, Davies et al. have assembled data on national 
levels and distribution of wealth for twenty countries that represent about 
59 percent of the world population and 75 percent of global wealth. These 
twenty countries compose the core of their dataset, but the assumed pos-
itive relationship between income and wealth inequality in this sample is 
then used to estimate wealth inequality levels in 124 more countries. More 
specifically, they used the income distribution data from the World Income 
Inequality Database to generate imputations of wealth inequality, assuming 
that the ratio of the Lorenz co-ordinates for wealth as compared to income 
46 See also the comment by Wilterdink, Vermogensongelijkheid in Nederland, 358.
47 Kooiman and Lejour, Vermogensongelijkheid in Nederland.
48 See James Davies ed., Personal wealth from a global perspective (Oxford, New York: Oxford 
University Press 2008); James Davies et al., The level and distribution of global household wealth. 
NBER working paper 15508 (2009).
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are constant across countries.49 Interestingly, the Netherlands belongs to 
the core countries of Davies et al., who drew their information from the 
DNB household surveys and a 2003 study by van Els et al. on financial be-
haviour of Dutch households based on the DNB household surveys.50  
Figure 3 shows that whereas Davies et al. find the Netherlands some-
where in the middle ranks of their sample, the CBS estimates (see also 
Figure 1) suggest that the country is at the outer end of the international 
spectrum. Figure 3 offers Gini-coefficients of personal (intra-adult) wealth 
inequality in 26 countries around the year 2000 reported by Davies et al., 
including all of the 20 core countries.51 Davies et al. rank the Netherlands 
in this comparison with a Gini of 0.65 using the DNB household survey 
data, in contrast to the CBS estimate of around 0.78-0.82. How is it possi-
ble that the wealth inequality estimates for the Netherlands vary so widely? 
There are two explanations for the gap. First, we have already noted that 
the wealthiest strata of Dutch society are even more underrepresented in 
the household surveys than they are in the tax registers used by the CBS. 
49 Davies et al., The level and distribution of global household wealth, 20-21.
50 P.J.A. van Els, W.A. van den End and M.C.J. van Rooij, ‘Financial behaviour of Dutch house-
holds, Analysis of the DNB Household Survey 2003’, Research Memorandum WO no 744/0333 
Meb-Series no 2003-09 (2003).
51 Davies et al., The level and distribution of global household wealth, 45.
Source: Data from Davies et al., The level and distribution of global household wealth, Table 9, p. 45; for the 
CBS estimate of the Netherlands we took the average of years 1997 and 2006 (see figure 1).
Figure 3. Gini-coefficients of personal (intra-adult) wealth inequality in 25 coun-
tries, ca. 2000
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Second, Davies et al. decided to discard all negative wealth shares from their 
estimates in order to make them mutually comparable. Davies et al. were 
unable to obtain information on net debt positions for most of their coun-
tries and to ‘solve’ this data problem they instead report zero wealth shares 
for the bottom deciles (or quintiles) in the case of a negative share.52 Yet, as 
van Els et al. remark in their study, the net debt position of Dutch house-
holds was extraordinarily large in 2001, and a substantial part of their paper 
in fact warned against the trend of growing mortgage debt and the with-
drawal of housing equity for consumption purposes by stepping up their 
mortgage loans, made possible by the steep house price rise of the 1990s.53 
A closer inspection of the limited number of countries with wealth in-
equality figures based on what Davies et al. consider as ‘hard data’ (p. 17) 
reveals another problem.54 The evidence for the supposed correlation be-
tween income and wealth inequality that underpins their extrapolation 
exercise to 124 countries is absent. In figure 4 we plot the independently 
computed Gini coefficients of wealth inequality from the 20 core coun-
tries against the reported gross household income inequality Ginis from 
the WIID data, excluding Germany and Indonesia for which the WIID has 
no gross household income inequality estimates. Figure 4 shows that there 
is no evidence for a positive correlation between both types of inequali-
ty. This comparative perspective adds another dimension to the debate on 
the paradoxical relationship between high wealth inequality levels and the 
Dutch welfare system, which is financed by progressive income taxes. This 
paradox will be discussed in the section ‘The distributional paradox of a 
Northern European welfare state?’.  
When looking more closely at the Gini coefficients of wealth distribution 
it is striking that most European countries are found in the range between 
0.6 and 0.7, but that the European countries at the top end are Denmark 
(0.808), Switzerland (0.803), Sweden (0.742) and France (0.73). Note that 
these Ginis would have been even higher if Davies et al. had not subtracted 
net negative wealth from their estimates. These countries are classic exam-
ples of social welfare states characterised by low (Switzerland, France) or 
even very low (Denmark, Sweden) levels of income inequality indeed. And 
this pattern is consistent with the CBS figures for the Netherlands (0.792).
We find more gaps when comparing the wealth inequality figures re-
ported by Davies et al – which are to a large extent based on surveys of es-
52 Ibidem, 20 and 45.
53 Els, End and Rooij, ‘Financial behaviour of Dutch households’, 1-13.
54 Davies et al., The level and distribution of global household wealth, 17
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tate and wealth tax returns -, with those based on household surveys in sev-
eral national investigations and the Luxembourg Wealth Studies (LWS).55 
The Gini-coefficients of net household wealth for the years 1999-2002 are 
broadly similar for the US (LWS: 0.81-0.84 versus Davies: 0.801) and the UK 
(0.66 versus 0.697), but for Germany (0.78 versus 0.667), Sweden (0.89 ver-
sus 0.742) and Finland (0.68 versus 0.615) the gaps are huge.
Countries such as Denmark, Switzerland, Sweden and the Netherlands 
can all be labelled social welfare states of the ‘Rhineland type’, also dubbed 
coordinated market economies or social market economies.56 These coun-
tries are characterised by cooperation between stakeholders, substantial 
income redistribution, employment protection, encompassing systems of 
55 Sierminska, Brandolini and Smeeding, Comparing wealth distribution across rich countries, 
table 9.
56 Peter A. Hall and David W. Soskice, ‘An introduction to varieties of capitalism’, in: Peter A. 
Hall and David W. Soskice ed., Varieties of capitalism. The institutional foundations of comparative 
advantage (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press 2001) 1-70, 18-21; J. Pontusson, Inequality 
and prosperity social Europe vs liberal America (New York: Ithaca 2006) 3-6.
Figure 4. Wealth inequality (horizontal axis) versus gross household income  
inequality (vertical axis), circa 2000
Sources: Davies et al. The level and distribution of global household wealth, table 7 and 9; World Income In-
equality Database V2.0c May 2008, gross household income inequality, national coverage, same year or 
closest by, http://www.wider.unu.edu/research/Database/en_GB/database/ (21-03-2010). Countries includ-
ed are: Australia, Canada, China, Denmark, Finland, France, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, South Korea, New 
Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and USA, and the average CBS estimate of the Nether-
lands for the years 1997 and 2006.
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social security and modest income inequality, especially in comparison to 
the Anglo-Saxon countries.57 
It appears that from the nine European countries typically classified in 
this group, i.e. Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Denmark, Sweden, Norway and Finland, at least seven have ‘unexpected-
ly’ high levels of wealth inequality. This paradox was also noted by the au-
thors who used the SHARE data to reconstruct inequality levels among 
people aged 50 years and older. In their analysis of thirteen EU countries 
for 2006/2007, they find the highest discrepancy between low levels of net 
income inequality and high levels of wealth inequality for Sweden and Den-
mark, while the Netherlands also displayed a high level of wealth inequality 
compared to average levels of income inequality in this age group.58 Indeed, 
the Netherlands seems to fit into a broader group of Northern European 
welfare states. Is the paradox of low income inequality and high wealth in-
equality perhaps inherent to the economic and political characteristics of 
Rhineland welfare states? 
6  The inequality paradox of Northern European  
welfare states?
In the absence of consistent long-term time series it is impossible to draw 
firm conclusions about the evolution of Dutch wealth inequality in the 
long twentieth century.59 What we do know about Dutch developments, 
however, fits with a general pattern found in the Western world. The fig-
ures we have, suggest a substantial decrease of inequality up to the 1970s 
and a slow, intermittent rise thereafter. The underlying factors of this rise 
found more generally in the West also hold for the Netherlands.60 As dis-
cussed by Nico Wilterdink in his recent overview, income from wealth has 
been rising, while income from labour has been stagnating or rising slowly. 
Inequality is particularly driven up by the quickly rising prices in the stock 
market. Seen over the longer run, and despite temporary crises and price 
falls, stock market prices in the Netherlands started an unprecedented rise 
in 1982. We may add, as another factor, Piketty’s argument that large cap-
57 A.B. Atkinson and T. Piketty ed., Top Incomes Over the Twentieth Century. A Contrast Between 
Continental European and English-Speaking Countries (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2007).
58 Skopek, Buchholz and Blossfeld, Wealth inequality in Europe and the delusive egalitarianism 
of Scandinavian countries, esp. 16.
59 Coenen, this issue.
60 Wilterdink, Vermogensongelijkheid in Nederland, 373 ff.
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ital portfolios, and especially large financial capital, generate higher rates 
of return than small capital portfolios.61 We doubt whether the rising in-
equality of income has contributed much to the rise of wealth inequality 
in the Netherlands, as Wilterdink suggests, because net income inequality 
according to the official figures has hardly increased over the past decades. 
This leaves open the possibility that income from capital is underrepresent-
ed in the Dutch income statistics, as argued above, and that this did con-
tribute to growing wealth inequality.
For some other countries of the Northern European welfare state type, 
the chronology has been charted with much better data. In Germany and 
Sweden for instance, long-term series of wealth inequality corroborate a ris-
ing trend during the last quarter of the twentieth century.62 And the causes 
mentioned are similar. These include the unprecedented rises in the value 
of stocks and real estate, and also the increasing asset mobility since the 
1980s, which has contributed to the evasion and relaxation of wealth tax-
ation. Stocks and other types of financial wealth are especially over-repre-
sented in the asset portfolios of the rich. It is generally assumed that there 
is a positive relationship between stock price developments and the share 
of wealth owned by the super-rich, because the latter tend to hold a dis-
proportionally large share of their wealth in company shares,63 and these 
are taxed only at a low rate and to an ever lesser extent. 
Even though a rise of Dutch private wealth inequality in the period 1975-
1995 is hard to establish empirically, the CBS estimates of 1991-2012 strongly 
suggest that current levels are high from an international perspective and 
consistent with other Northern European welfare states. What explains the 
contrast between income and wealth inequality in these countries? Our 
tentative explanation has three key components. First, because of the im-
portance of collective arrangements for household asset portfolios in wel-
fare states, the concept of ‘private wealth’ misses a substantial part of to-
tal household wealth in a broader sense. Second, the organisation of such 
collective arrangements tends to equalise the income distribution in the 
Northern European welfare states via progressive income taxes, but leaves 
61 Piketty, Capital, 430-32.  
62 J.R. Frick and M.M. Grabka, ‘Wealth inequality on the rise in Germany’, German Institute for 
Economic Research 10 (2009) 62-73; J. Roine and D. Waldenström, ‘Wealth concentration over the 
path of development. Sweden, 1873-2006’, Scandinavian Journal of Economics 111 (2009) 151-187. 
63 M. Jäntti, ‘Trends in the distribution of income and wealth. Finland, 1987-98’, in: E.N. Wolff 
ed., International perspectives on household wealth (Cheltenham: Elgar 2006) 295-326; F. Torche 
and S. Spilerman, ‘Household wealth in Latin America’, in: J.B. Davies ed., Personal wealth from a 
global perspective (New York: Oxford University Press 2008) 150-176, 167.
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the accumulation of private wealth largely untouched. Third, the incentives 
built into this system of collective welfare arrangements as well as the rel-
atively high levels of income taxation required to sustain it, dis-incentivise 
the lower income strata to accumulate wealth.      
The concept of ‘private net worth’ does not capture the collective and 
public arrangements that are put in place to guarantee lifetime income 
security. In Northern European welfare states, collective and public funds 
to a great degree secure people against the income risks of old-age, un-
employment or incapacity. Also, the state tends to support human capital 
accumulation by providing easy and affordable access to education for all 
strata of society. Part of the ‘inequality’ in the private wealth distribution 
in Rhineland countries is thus compensated by a relatively egalitarian dis-
tribution of the claims to collectively held assets. 
Therefore, the incentive on the part of lower income groups to save in 
order to counter the risk of income losses due to unemployment, illness 
or old age, is lower than in countries without encompassing social securi-
ty systems. The provision of cheap public education of reasonable quality 
also lowers the propensity to increase household savings for education of 
children, potentially enhancing the inter-generational inequality in financi-
al capital accumulation.64 State-guaranteed income security thus may also 
in part explain the large size of negative wealth ownership in the Rhine-
land welfare states, both in terms of the percentage share of net debtors 
as well as the relative size of their debt. In Sweden, for instance, this group 
comprises 24 percent of total households, and in Denmark even more.65 
The inclusion of net debtors has a considerable impact on the skewing 
of the wealth distribution. It is not clear, however, to what extent the size 
of negative wealth ownership in the Rhineland countries in practice is lar-
ger than, for instance, in the Anglo-Saxon countries. The figures assembled 
in LWS do not indicate a fundamental difference: the percentage of house-
holds with negative net wealth ownership around 2000 is also large in Ca-
nada (twenty percent) and the USA (sixteen to nineteen percent), whereas 
in a Rhineland country like Germany this percentage is rather low (nine 
percent, although no less than 29 percent reported with nil net worth).66 
 Security does play an important role in the decision to save for old age. 
Of the Dutch households in the social economic panel survey of 1988, when 
64 See also: Skopek, Buchholz and Blossfeld, Wealth inequality in Europe and the delusive egali-
tarianism of Scandinavian countries.
65 P. Klein, Accounting for Swedish wealth inequality. Econometric Society World Congress 2000 
contributed papers 0883 (2000).
66 Sierminska, Brandolini and Smeeding, Comparing wealth distribution across rich countries, 31.
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asked for their motives to save, only two percent responded by citing old 
age.67 People in the Netherlands and other Rhineland countries are clearly 
counting on the encompassing nature of state subsidies for old-age and the 
vast collective pension schemes to which many employees contribute con-
siderable parts of their labour earnings. This effect has also been demon-
strated for Finland (2004), with its mainly employment-based schemes, 
and pension rights making up no less than 47 percent of total wealth, and 
Germany (2007), with its huge pension funds and its pension rights with 
a total present value of € 4,590 billion in 2007, making up 43 percent of 
total wealth. In both cases, the effect would decrease the Gini by sixteen 
percentage points.68 
Low variability of income caused by tight labour regulations and ex-
tensive social security schemes may induce private risk-taking behaviour, 
but it also incentivises financial institutions to supply consumer credit or 
mortgage loans if household incomes are more secure. They ‘help’ peop-
le to incur debt at some points in their life-cycle, especially when starting 
a family, buying a house or for consumption purposes, especially people 
in their thirties. However, this pattern is also observed in the Anglo-Saxon 
countries like the US and the UK,69 leaving open the question of the extent 
to which the role of financial institutions can be regarded as a distinctive 
characteristic of Northern European welfare states. 
The extent of private debt-creation may be a relatively new pheno-
menon. Most of the Rhineland countries have built up encompassing sys-
tems of social security, including old-age income provisions, labour disabili-
ty insurances and extensive unemployment benefits, only after the Second 
World War. It is therefore only recently that the political ideal and the eco-
nomic practice of state guaranteed ‘lifetime income security’ has started 
to affect the asset management decisions of households. The changes in 
the anticipation of risk and the different attitude towards incurring debts 
are arguably affecting mentality changes within our own generation, but 
apply to our parents’ or grandparents’ generation only to a lesser extent. 
That said, the very idea of lifetime income security has come under 
strain in recent years due to increasing liberalisation of labour market reg-
67 Rob Alessie and Arie Kapteyn, Wealth and savings. Data and trends in the Netherlands, VU 
Research Memorandum 46 (1999) 11-12. 
68 Joachim R. Frick and Markus M. Grabka, ‘Old-age pension entitlements mitigate inequality. 
But concentration of wealth remains high’, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research 
Weekly Report 6 (2010) 55-64; Tallamaria Maunu, The distribution of pension wealth in Finland. 
Finnish Centre for Pensions working papers 2010:3 (2010).
69 Sierminska, Brandolini and Smeeding, Comparing wealth distribution across rich countries, 34.
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ulations as well as the growing number of freelance jobs, temporary con-
tracts and project-based labour hires. This has led to renewed insecurity 
about people’s income position and related difficulties to build up suffi-
cient pension rights or conclude a mortgage for the purchase of real es-
tate. If our argument is correct that the design and expansion of the Dutch 
social security system has created disincentives to accumulate wealth, we 
would see a reversal of this trend in times of a retreating state, thus cre-
ating more incentives for lower income groups to save. However, the same 
changes in the labour market and the downward pressure on real wages 
may also reduce the opportunity for ordinary households to save and ac-
cumulate at all.
7  Comparative tax regimes
Tax regimes supporting the heavy weight of social security expenditures 
on government budgets also have an impact on wealth distribution. In 
Northern European welfare states, the taxes press mainly on labour and 
consumption (V.A.T.), and to a lesser extent on wealth. This reduces oppor-
tunities for lower income groups to accumulate wealth, while it increases 
opportunities for wealth owners to expand their wealth. As shown in Fi-
gure 5, in the Rhineland countries wealth taxes (including taxes on wealth 
inheritance and transaction) constitute about 1.5 percent of GDP, which is 
less than half the proportion in the Anglo-Saxon countries (3.2 percent). 
Apart from the question of whether there is sufficient political leverage 
to tax wealth, the costs of monitoring and levying wealth taxes are higher 
than in the case of income or consumption. Asset mobility has increased 
in the last decades of the twentieth century, which has made it easier to 
avoid or escape wealth taxes. Hence, the rich have clear incentives to have 
part of their income (i.e. the part not needed to fulfil short-term consump-
tion desires) paid in the form of company shares or other types of assets, 
in order to subsequently shield them from taxation.
Lastly, a share of private wealth remains outside all registration and is 
not taxed at all. This share is probably fairly substantial, especially whe-
re it concerns top wealth, as this consists largely of financial wealth that 
is easier to move and hide, and that is possessed by wealth owners who 
have the means to hire the financial, legal and fiscal expertise needed to 
this end. The exact size of this wealth is very difficult to estimate. Recent 
investigation on the basis of disclosed bank data concludes that about 12 
percent of European private wealth is stored in tax havens, of which about 
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half is in Switzerland. About three-quarters of this wealth is unregistered 
and not taxed.70
The declining importance of wealth tax revenue, the difficulties in mo-
nitoring and possibly also ideological reasons have induced several policy- 
makers to advocate further reductions in taxes on wealth and income from 
wealth, and even fuelled propositions to abolish them altogether. Perhaps 
surprisingly, in an international perspective this has happened most conspi-
cuously in the Northern European welfare states. The taxation of wealth 
revenue was abolished in Austria in 1994, in Denmark and Germany in 1997 
and in the Netherlands in 2001. During the latest tax reform in the Nether-
lands in that year, the capital levy was raised from 0.7 to 1.2 percent, but 
at the same time taxation of actual income from savings or investments 
was abolished.71 Previously, the larger wealth owners had been paying 60 
percent income tax on income generated from capital or wealth. This im-
plies that in the case of an average annual net return of four percent the 
fiscal rate has declined from 3.1 percent (2.4 + 0.7) to 1.2 percent. To be sure, 
70 G. Zucman, ‘The missing wealth of nations. Are Europe and the U.S. net debtors or net cred-
itors?’, The quarterly journal of economics 128 (2013) 1321-1364.
71 B. Jacobs, ‘Belastingen op kapitaalinkomen in Nederland’, Tijdschrift voor Openbare Financiën 
47 (2015) 24-48.
Figure 5. Taxes on property as percentage of GDP, 2006 
Source: OECD, Growing unequal? Revenue Statistics 1965-2007. 
Notes: The taxes refer to category 4000 in the OECD revenue statistics; it includes recurrent taxes on im-
movable property, recurrent taxes on net wealth, estate, inheritance and gift taxes, taxes on financial and 
capital transactions and other (non-) recurrent taxes on property.
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the average net return of this example may be too high for small capital 
owners, especially in the light of low interest paid on savings, but on aver-
age fairly mild for large capital owners who hold different asset portfolios. 
In view of the fierce international competition in financial markets, 
many governments, including those of the Rhineland countries, have been 
pressed to adopt a relatively mild fiscal regime for businesses and their cap-
ital assets. An analysis of changes in the corporate income tax in sixteen 
countries (part of the EU plus G7) over the period 1982 to 2001 shows that 
the effective average tax rate was reduced substantially, that is, more than 
20 percentage points, in five of these countries. Of these, four are Rhine-
land welfare states: Austria, Finland, Germany and Sweden.72 In part, this 
was a process of convergence with rates in the Anglo-Saxon countries, and 
the levels reached were broadly similar around 2000. However, the process 
proceeded thereafter. In the Netherlands, the period 2003-2011 saw a de-
72 M.P. Devereux, R. Griffith and A. Klemm, ‘Corporate income tax reforms and international 
tax competition’, Economic policy 35 (2002) 450-497.
Illustration 2: An estimated 12 percent of European private wealth is stored in tax 
havens, of which about half is in Switzerland. About three-quarters of this wealth is 
unregistered (see Zucman, note 70). Source of the picture: www.forbes.com/sites/ 
robertwood/2014/05/19/credit-suisse-guilty-2-5-billion-fine-but-avoids-death-in-u-s-
ubs-was-luckier/#7a816f182df8.
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cline in the implicit tax rate on capital, business income and corporations 
amounting to no less than 44 percent in total.73 This happened while the 
Rhineland countries, much more so than the Anglo-Saxon countries, were 
struggling to fund their relatively extensive welfare systems.
The revenues to fund the welfare state are hardly found in the realm of 
property, wealth transfers or wealth revenue taxes. Inheritance taxes, for in-
stance, have been reduced or even abolished in most Rhineland countries 
in the past decades. In 2005, succession taxes in the Netherlands amounted 
to no more than € 1,709 billion or eighteen percent of the € 9,450 billion de-
clared and taxed as net wealth inherited that year and no more than eight 
percent of the total amount of €22 billion inherited that year.74 In all Western 
countries, including both the Rhineland and Anglo-Saxon types, the weight 
of inheritance taxes has shrunk to insignificance since the 1970s and makes 
up only a very small share of total state revenues, usually lower than one 
percent.75 Inheritances can result in lower wealth inequality (Wolff, 2002), 
especially when distributed among many children, but this inter-generation-
al effect has decreased as a result of declining birth rates, while wealth can 
now be transferred to the next generation relatively unaffected by taxation.
The supposed inefficiency of wealth taxation alone cannot explain why 
income and consumption in the Rhineland countries are increasingly tar-
geted instead of wealth. Figure 5 has shown that Rhineland countries in 
general tend to tax property less than Anglo-Saxon countries such as the 
US, UK and Australia. As a percentage share of GDP the Anglo-Saxon coun-
tries, with the exception of New Zealand, tend to tax wealth at least twice as 
heavily as the average Rhineland welfare state. Also compared to the OECD 
Total (2.0) or the EU15 (2.2), the Rhineland countries remain below average. 
In other words, the Rhineland welfare states tend to base the additional 
tax effort required to maintain the supply of social security and collective 
goods, on income and consumption, but certainly not on private wealth.
As a result, taxes on income from labour in Rhineland countries are 
much higher than those on income from wealth. The disparity in tax levels 
is huge. For the Netherlands, where extensive negative income from wealth 
is subsidised it is estimated that taxation on income from labour amounts 
to 40-45 percent, while for income from wealth this is c. 9 percent.76 Simi-
73 Eurostat, 2014 edition Taxation trends in the European Union Data for the EU Member States, 
Iceland and Norway (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union 2014). 
74 Gilst, Nijboer and Caminada, ‘De successiebelasting vanuit economisch perspectief’.
75 Graziella Bertocchi, ‘The vanishing bequest tax. The comparative evolution of bequest taxa-
tion in historical perspective’, Economics & politics 23 (2011) 107-132.
76  Jacobs, ‘Belastingen op kapitaalinkomen’, 29.
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lar differences may be found in the Scandinavian countries with their dual 
taxation systems,77 where nominal tax rates on corporate profits and capital 
gains are much lower than the top rates of taxes on labour income, while 
the first can easily be further reduced by using exemptions and other tax- 
reducing measures. It is striking that this dual taxation system is prevalent 
in these Scandinavian countries and the other countries that have compo-
nents of this system include Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands, while 
introduction is considered in Germany and Switzerland, all being Northern 
European welfare states.
 
 
8  Conclusion
Despite the difficult interpretation of the very fragmented data, three ‘styl-
ised facts’ have emerged from earlier and recent attempts to reconstruct 
the broad trends in Dutch wealth inequality since the Second World War. 
First, Dutch wealth inequality has declined, and probably rather substan-
tially, up to the 1970s. Second, but this is more tentative, wealth inequality 
has started to rise in the 1980s, and continued to rise, with temporary in-
terruptions, since then. Although the data required to make solid compari-
sons over time are lacking, because of the absence of a consistent post-war 
time-series, there are two reasons to believe that current levels of private 
wealth inequality are (much) higher than they were in the early post-war 
decades (1950s-1970s). 
First, because the factors that caused a considerable reduction in wealth 
inequality during the 1930s and 1940s (i.e. collapse of stock markets, war-
time destructions and dispossessions, post-war monetary reforms) have not 
occurred ever since, so that new processes of selective accumulation got 
free play. The absence of such shocks in the second half of the twentieth 
century allowed private wealth portfolios to grow undisturbed. 
Second, because wealth tax regulations were much more progressive up 
to the mid-1960s than they were after the tax reforms of 1964 and the later 
reductions of wealth taxes, a process that still continues. The recent shock 
of the 2008 financial crisis did not lead to a levelling of wealth inequality 
but to a further sharpening. It shows that the wealth of the richest groups 
in society has become increasingly immune to shocks at a local or national 
level. Instead of being invested in local real estate, much of this wealth is 
77 S. Cnossen, What Kind of Corporation Tax Regime? CESifo Working Paper Series No. 5108 (CPB 
Netherlands Bureau of Economic Policy Analysis 2014) 23-25 and Table 2.
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invested as financial capital outside the national borders. The strong inter-
vention of national authorities and central banks in financial markets has 
avoided a sharp reduction in financial wealth, while the costs of ‘rescuing’ 
financial institutions were borne by income and consumption taxes, thus 
shifting the burden to the lower strata of the wealth distribution.
A third stylised fact is that, while levels of income inequality are low by 
any international standard, levels of private wealth inequality are not. Some 
evidence even suggests that current private wealth inequality in the Nether-
lands is exceptionally high in international perspective. This paradox of low 
income inequality and high private wealth inequality, as we have argued, 
is probably inherent to the particularities of Northern European welfare 
state systems and can at least in part be explained by the extensive social 
arrangements and collective pension systems in these countries. These ar-
rangements reduce the need for households to save wealth as a safety net, 
while the funding of these systems mainly presses on income from labour 
and consumption and thus precludes the opportunity for many households 
to accumulate wealth. So even if the rise in private wealth inequality is 
offset by the large entitlements of the middling households to collective 
pension savings or that of poorer households to social arrangements, the 
fundamental change of the structure of the wealth distribution over the 
past decades remains a fact of social, political and economic importance.
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